Europe: nation states and globalisation. Przykład eseju napisanego w ramach studiów na Uniwersytecie w Leeds

MA in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES:
Contemporary Societies and Culture

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION Ukończyłam studia w York St John - College of the University of Leeds na kierunku: Współczesne Społeczeństwa i Kultura. Odbyte studia umożliwiły mi uzyskanie stopnia MA Uniwersytetu w Leeds, prestiżowej uczelni brytyjskiej. Zaliczanie modułów polegało głównie na pisaniu esejów, które były następnie punktowane przez Komisję Egzaminacyjną w Anglii. Chciałabym zaprezentować przykładową pracę na zaliczenie modułu.

MODULE IV
EUROPE: NATION STATES AND GLOBALISATION
YORK ST JOHN COLLEGE The topic of the essay: "Relationships between states in Western Europe have been marked by competition as much as by co-operation." Analyse the statement with reference to different countries, especially Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

Bainbridge sees the European Union in a symbolic way as "...a metal ball freely suspended over a triangular base.... The ball... wobbles at random, under the influence of each magnet in turn..." (Bainbridge, 2002, p. xii). Do the angles of the triangle represent the three core states: the United Kingdom, France and Germany which have alternately influenced the European political arena?

Introduction

After the Second World War Europe was divided and Germany totally defeated and splitted into two parts. Although prejudices and fears being the consequence of the horrors of the past war were strong, luckily they were overcome by common sense and good will of the European nations. Integration occurred and the beginning of this process took place in the West. It started from the establishment of constructive relations between France and Germany. Although the United Kingdom was not fully engaged in in the integration process its important position in Europe is undeniable. Thus, the collaboration of European countries resulted in, firstly ECSC and EEC and finally - the European Union. The countries formed an alliance which had an effect of making political and economic agreements of crucial importance. They include: the treaty of Paris of 1951, German accession to NATO in 1955, the creation of the European Economic Community in 1958 the Treaty of Elysee of 1963, the reunification of Germany in 1990 and the post-Maastricht implementation of Economic and Monetary Union in 1990 and finally a large, strong European Union. Notwithstanding, the achievements were accompanied by stormy events. In my essay I intend to bring closer some of the common initiatives, yet marked with conflicts of national interests between the UK, France and Germany after 1945.

HOW IT ALL STARTED

Siedentop argues that the European Union is a French creation. The major initiatives - from Schuman's plan for a Coal and Steel Community, through the Common Agricultural Policy, to the single currency - have been French and have served the French interests. There is a poster commemorating the birth of European integration depicting two men, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, standing together "at the beginning of the European Community" (Dinan, 1999, p. 9).

Jean Monnet - a senior French official was in favour of sectoral economic integration and the changing of the nation state into a European federation. The ECSC had a supranational and transnational character as the High Authority which was a forerunner of the Commission could make decisions at the level above that of national governments. Nevertheless, the French President Charles de Gaulle showed inflexible opposition to supranationalism. The 1960 were a difficult period due to rising dichotomy between intergovermentalism and supranationalism, between the supposed decline of the nation-state and the rise of a European federation (Dinan, 1999).

In those years France benefited from the weakness of German political will and the absence of Britain from the Common Market, no wonder the French political class was able to construct in Brussels a European creation which reflected the French vision of Europe, French habits and French interests. There was one problem of central importance, though, the grand potential of Germany. In the early post-war years, as many political scientists argue, security and particularly the need for Franco-German reconciliation, were the primary motivation behind the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

A BRITISH POINT OF VIEW

Britain has always had a sense of political distance from the Continent and perceived its role as a link between the United states and the Continent.

Siedetop in Democracy in Europe, gives a thorough philosophical background to the democratic developments being built in Europe. Siedentop sees all the discrepances in different states' points of view in different traditions of law. According to him, the English Common Law tradition tends to affirm the priority of social relations and the market to the state, while the continental tradition of the Roman Law affirms the priority of the state to social relations and the marketplace. Siedentop pictures two contradictory views of the construction of Europe. He says one view is associated with Britain and puts a lot of stress on, "the completion of a single market, economic integration and interdependence of state" (Siedentop, 2000, p. 151).

As Dinan remarks (Dinan, 1999, p.50), Britain applied for the EC membership only for negative reasons as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan understood that joining the EC was within Britain's interest at that time. The Commonwealth was no longer promoting British interests and the EC was flourishing. The conservatives basically opted for the joining.

In 1961 the UK entry was denied by France. France saw a rival in the UK and feared that it could deprive France from leadership in Europe. According to Siedentop (Siedentop, 2000), France saw Britain as a Trojan horse for the US interests. In 1963 the President of France vetoed the UK's accession to EEC and four years later the situation happened again. Another reason for opposing UK as a member of the Community was a fear of UK Labour government for having an opportunistic approach to Europe and lacking even the less than total commitment of the Conservatives. The impasse took place until the 1970.

Then de Gaulle was replaced by George Pompidou and Heath won the British general election. The economic, especially monetary situation of France was highly unfavourable at that time, so Pompidou was in a weaker position to veto British membvership. As a result, Britain joined the Community in 1973.

The British Prime Minister - Macmillan even purged his Cabinet of a few antimarketeers and appointed Edward Heath, who ultimately brought Britain into the EC. Labour Party was divided but the majority of the opposition was very suspicious of the European integration. (Dinan, 1999) as the main objective of Macmillan's policy was to restore and maintain the Anglo-American "special relationship" (Dinan, 1999, p. 50).

Macmillan's policy was more pro-American than pro-European. He established close ties with Presidednt Kennedy who supported British membership in the EC. This strenghtened Macmillan's determination to join but at the same time, aroused de Gaulle's suspitions.

Technical details were the subsequent obstacles to the accession negotiations, mainly over the CAP, the Commonwealth and EVTA.The British, "white paper" outlined the problems in all the three areas. There was also an impass in food matters. In agriculture Britain's strategy of buying low-priced food on the world market and paying farmers direct price support were incompatible with the principles of the CAP. Moreover, as for the Commonwealth Britain feared the political and economic impact on its former possessions and the disruption of traditional trade patterns.

In terms of security Britain was closely tied to America through the Nassau agreement which governed the use of milliles and the conditions of UK's integration into NAT. De Gaulle responded to this saying: "...a damning surrender of sovereignty." (Dinan, 1999, p.52)

In a press conference on January 14, 1963 which was called by Paul Henri Spaak "the black Monday", de Gaulle dramatically presented his view of the British foreign policy. De Gaulle doubted that "... Britain can place herself... inside a tarrrif which is genuinely common... renounce all Commonwealth preferences... cease any pretense that her agriculturebe privileged, and more than that... treat her engagementswith other countries of the Free Trade Area as null and void" (Dinan, 1999, p. 52).

In the mid-1970s the political crisis was even worse. This period is called, "Eurosclerosis" or "Europessimism" (Dinan, 1999, p. 57), due to painful transformation of the European political system which included: fluctuating superpower relations, the decline of the US's position in the European arena, growing German assertiveness, oscillating exchange rates, and widely uneven economic performance among the member states.

Since London was military linked to the US, it strongly fovoured a continued central role for NATO and the US in European affairs and was opposed to any initiatives which might weaken the position of NATO.

THE POLICY OF MARGARET THATCHER

The British opposition to European integration intensified in the 1980s, under the ideological leadership of Margaret Thatcher.

Mrs Thatcher strongly believed that the idea of federalism in future united Europe would threaten national sovereignty and independence and was very reluctant to any action abridging this sovereignty. She was also very afraid that the social policy of the Community would introduce, "socialism" into Britain through "the back door of European regulations and legislation." (Baun, 1996, p. 82). Thatcher showed her opposition to European federalism in the late 1980s in verbal battles with Delors.

In 1988 Mrs Thatcher delivered a speech in Bruges, in which she condemned federalist ideals and stressed the importance of the sovereignty and independence of the nation state. As Baun argues, Mrs Thatcher's demonstrated hostility towards the European inegration process was the main reason for her removal as Conservative Party leader in November 1990. In the referendum of June 1975 Mrs Thatcher campaigned in favour of the United Kingdom remaining a member of the Community not being very enthusiastic about it, though. Her first quarrel with the Community began in November 1979 over the level of the British net contribution to the Budget (Bainbridge, 2000) Overall, Mrs Thatcher's attitude towards the institutions of the Community was marked with a great deal of suspicion. She was, frustrated too in her efforts to reform the Common Agricultural Policy. However, in the Single Market Programme, which was launched after the Fuauntebbleau settlement, "...Mrs Thatcher found a Community objective to which she could give whole hearted support." (Bainbridge, 2002, p. 499). In 1986 she supported the Single European Act. As Bainbridge contends, she was later to argue that at the time she was not made fully aware of the implications of the SEA for the balance of power between the Community institutions and, in particular, for member states' rights of veto. (Bainbridge, 2002)

Mrs Thatcher's view of how European integration was similar to that of Charles de Gaulle: she shared his hostility to the supranational character of the European Comission and the European Parliament. Mrs. Thatcher consistently blocked any progress towards EMU. In June 1989 she was eventually persuaded to agree to the Madrid meeting of the European Council to the United Kingdom's participation in the first stage of Economic and Monetary Union. At the Strasburg meeting of the European Council in December 1989 she refused to sign the Social Charter (Bainbridge, 2002).

The British government, according to Baun was perhaps the most openly hostile to the idea of German unification at that time. Mrs. Thatcher was highly suspicious of German power and intentions. Following the collapse of the wall, Mrs. Thatcher even made an unsuccessful attempt to enter into an alliance with France to block unification and to counter German power through a revival of the Anglo-French "entente cordiale." Nevertheless, Mitterand opted for the strategy of integrating a united Germany more firmly into the Community. As Bainbridge puts it, by 1999 Mrs Thatcher's increasingly strident opposition to the European Community was the cause of concern among Conservative MPs and among her Cabinet colleagues. In November 1990 Sir Geoffrey Howe's resignation from the Cabinet prompted a leadership election from which Mrs Thatcher withdrew after the first ballot (Bainbridge, 2002).

It should be stressed that Mrs Thatcher's style of politics did not comply with the consensus-oriented decision-making system of the Community. Siedentop also provides a severe critique of Mrs Thatcher's government. According to Siedentop Thatcherism resembled Marxism in the way it grossly underestimated the importance of political institutions as she did not make any constitutional changes, which was a very serious misjudgement on her part and had impact on the international relations.

FRANCE AND GERMANY

The Franco-German partnership is regarded to be the primary axis of European integration.

In the late 1960s the French economic and monetary problems, namely a run on the franc lowered France's position in the international arena. Contrary to this Germany began to flourish economically and took the position before France. Not only was Germany economically strengthened at that time, but under the new chancellor, Willy Brandt, the Federal Republic was also politically assertive, as Dinan stresses. Germany refused to arrest the declining value of the franc by revaluing the mark. Furthermore, the German goverment was about to launch an ambitious initiative towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The combination of Germany's growing economic power and rising political confidence had impact on the strategy Pompidou adopted. Together, Britain and France might countrerbalance Germany's increasing power (Dinan, 1999).

No wonder there were tensions between states over German reunification. President Mitterand initially opposed German reunification, realising that united Germany with a population of 80 million would destroy the balance of power in Europe. In some political scientists' opinion France accepted the reunification in exchange for firm German pledges of commitment to further integration. This meant joining EMU in particular.

European Political Cooperation - the precursor of EMU was set up in 1970 as a result of joint initiative between Brandt and Pompidou. This led to intergovernmental co-operation in foreign affairs like: the Middle East the CSCE and the UN until the official ties were established in 1986. The common foreign policy was not a success, though. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Such difficulties strengthened call for a common EC foreign and security policy (S.Sweeney, 2001).

Afterwards, under the leadership of the Socialist Mitterand and the Christian Democrat Kohl, the Franco-German axis became a key factor promoting further integration. (Sweeney, 2001)

For Germany EPU was essential to agreement on EMU. Baun (1996) appreciates the German commitment to EPU. "...Germany was more easily reconciled to further political integration than were such centralised, unitary states as France and Britain" (Baun, 1996, p.80)

Kohl also needed EPU to gain support of the sceptical German public as well as achieve TEU ratification in the Bundestag, for which the support of the opposition SPD and the 16 federal states would be required (Sweeney, 2001).

The Delor's plan for monetary union was endorsed by EC leaders at a June 1989 summit in Madrid. But the German Chancellor - Helmut Kohl wanted greater powers for the European Parliament, something the French had consistently been less enthusiastic about. Kohl repeatedly expressed his his wish for "German Europeans and European Germans" (Baun, 1996, p. 45).

The act of agreeing to EMU surved the purpose of demonstrating the German willingness to give up national sovereignty and their commitment to European integration (Baun, 1996).

Both Delor and Mitterand favoured the rapid integration process and the reinforcement of the institutional structures of the Community. Both politicians claimed that the establishing of a firm timetable for monetary union was very important in view of the political upheavals in Eastern Europe and Germany. In 1989 the question of starting date for the EMU conference became a major subjet of controversy within the Community. Both Mitterand and Delor favored convening the conference as soon as possible after the beginning of of stage one, which was due to take place in July 1, 1990.

The Germans' viewpoint was entirely different. However, it was within their interest to delay the EMU conference as much as possible. Kohl feared that the beginning of an EMU conference before this point would provide the opposing parties with the decisive weapons during the federal election scheduled for December 1990. They would argue that Kohl's goverment was selling out German national interests by negotiating to give away monetary sovereignty and "the beloved D-mark" (Baun, 1996, p.41). On the other hand, Minister Genscher believed that aggreeing to firm dates for the conference would assuage the fears of other countries that Germany was loosing intrest in EMU and European integration.

THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW

The Treaty on the European Union entered into force in November 1993. In spite of all the torturous ratification procedure it represented an important step in the direction of further political union. The treaty aimed at achieving full monetary and currency union among EC countries by 1999. The treaty also established new intergovernmental mechanisms for cooperation on foreign and security policy, as well as on immigration, police and judicial affairs. It was a response by the EC and its member countries to German unification. Nevertheless, each country sought their own interest in ratifying the Treaty.

France was happy to see a unified, larger and potentially stronger German economy subsumed within a single currency. The end of the historically dominant D-Mark represented a good deal for France. For Germany it was demonstration of its commitment to European integration. In contrast, Britain under the leadership of Major was intransigent an seemed the most interested in preserving national prerogative and sovereignty (Baun, 1996). As Urwin contends, Major wished to be, "at the heart of Europe" (Urwin, 1997, p.315).

Germany placed some conditions on EMU. They included the independence of the ECB, sanctions against member governments who failed to show fiscal rectitude, and that the new currency should seek to be both stable and strong. Furthermore, Kohl wanted a stronger European Parliament to which France obviously opposed.

Among German monetary and financial authorities, there was a widespread opposition too. In addition to the objections that EMU would undermine Bundesbank soveregnty, these authorities felt that monetary union was simply not workable and will bring about considerable divergence of economic conditions among EC countries. On the other hand, the French government wanted to ensure that in the future German monetary authorities would act more responsibly by being compelled to take European not simply German, economic needs and interests into consideration when making their policies. These views were shared by most other EC countries, except Britain, which still remained outside the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS and general opposed any further moves toward monetary integration as a threat to national sovereignty.

Nowadays, the French political class is thought to be dominated by administrators for whom political and administrative careers are bound up together. "The elite has shaped the EU so far." (Siedentop, 2000, p.136). France, one of the wealthiest European nations pays so little into "European coffers" or that the French occupy so many key positions within the European Union.(Siedentop, ibid.)

As recent figures about the net contributions by member states have become available, the German people have the right to show signs of their discontent with the status quo. The remarkable thing is that the figures released by the German Government differ from the figures released by the Commission in Brussels. The latter are the result of the pressures on the Commission to minimize discontent among some contributors. For example for Germany the figures are as follows: (10.00 and 10.94) and for France: 0.4 and 0.78 (Siedentop, 2000, p. 137). To many politicians these figures are indicatice of France's privilaged position in the EU. Furthermore, the French have always attached great importance to securing the most important European posts for French or French - sympathetic candidates, which happened again, when France sought to the first presidency of the European Bank for a Frenchman, against the wishes of virtually the whole of the Community.

COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The French were also chiefly responsible for the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy. It has given France significant, long-term financial advantages as Siedentop argues (Siedentop, 2001), and no wonder France was not interested in any major reforms of the CAP.

CAP - was introduced in 1962 aiming to essure the food market security in Europe. Initially the CAP was seen as laying the ground for intensified European integration. The CAP was intended to be a kind of protection for domestic agricultural policy and owing to this the sector of agriculture in the Union became a planned economy. Agriculture was included in the GATT framework, now attached to the World Trade Organization. Unfortunately, CAP started to serve as a tool in the growing competition between states and reforms to the CAP have been delayed or even stopped by national interests. As elmar Rieger puts it, "... the CAP remains a bureaucratic system of economic. The Economist called it,"... the single most idiotic system of economic mismanagement.... "" (Rieger in Wallace&Wallace, p. 182)

It is remarkable that the drawbacks of the the system derive from not bereaucracy in Brussels (Rieger in Wallace &Wallace, 2000), but from the competition and divisions between nation states (Rieger in Wallace and Wallace, 2000) which distinctively reflects the situation in Europe.

As Siedentop puts it, the German government tried to overhaul the CAP and reduce too big costs of German contribution to the EU budget in 1999, the French goverment however, managed to argue that CAP was a French national interest and reform was postponed, which happened not for the first time (Siedentop, 2000). The new Schroder Government decided to seek reform of the CAP which were unfortunately blocked by France, too.
According to Rieger, western countries act in accordance with domestic preferences showing total disregard for the international consequences and despite the obvious interdependencies of agricultural and other product markets. In the language of politics it is called, "Community preference". This principle lies in the deeply rooted conviction that no trade agreement should result in injury to domestic products (Rieger in Wallace and Wallace, 2000, p.195).
The political scientist goes on saying that CAP combined with WTO has strengthened agricultural nationalism in the member states of the EU (Rieger in Wallace and Wallace, 2000).

Closing paragraph

Co-operation between states in order to better the well-being of their citizens is a natural phenomenon and has been observed since the first political entities came into being. Nevertheless, competition or even rivalry between states is inevitable if they want to retain sovereignty and sound economy, testifying to their political freedom. This tendency is in agreement with the philosophy of realism. Yet, it seems to me that such, "fundamental tanet of realism that states will always seek more power" (Peterson quated in Sweeney, 2001, p. 38) belongs to the past. I strongly believe that in the era of globalization co-operation will replace copetition for the benefit of all concerned. Reformism is gradully taking a higher position in political philosophy and the Rousseau's conviction that an individual should make sacrifices for the common good does not sound awkward. Nowadays, environmental, ecological social, educational, health issues are being solved more and more frequently at the international, not national level and various common undertakings, international agreements and treaties testify to this claim. I hope that the British intergovernmentalism, German Federalism and French bureaucracy will one day merge completely resulting in a perfect Union.

References:

1. Baun, M.J. (1996) An Imperfect Union, Westview Press
2. Bainbridge, T. (2002) The Penguin Companion to the European Union, Penguin
3. Dinan, D. (1999) Ever Closer Union?, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
4. Sweeney, S. (2001) Europe: Nation States and Globalisation
5. Siedentop, L. (2000) Democracy in Europe, Penguin
6. Wallace, H. and Wallace, W. (2000) Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford University Press
7. Urwin, D.W. (1997) A Political History of Western Europe since 1945, Pearson Education
 

Opracowanie: Marzena Drużdżel - nauczyciel języka angielskiego w Zespole Szkół Ekonomicznych w Radomiu